Management Economics in a Large Retail Organization by Siebert, W. Stanley & Zubanov, Nikolay
IZA DP No. 3645



























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
August 2008 
Management Economics in a 
Large Retail Organization 
 
 
W. Stanley Siebert 
University of Birmingham 
and IZA  
 
Nikolay Zubanov 
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 












P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 
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We study the impact of and reward to middle management ability using data from 245 stores 
of a nationwide retailer. The company scores six broad areas of management practice, the 
most important of which turns out to be “commercial awareness”, where able managers raise 
labour productivity by 17% compared to less able. We show that the managers’ incentive 
scheme is implicitly an insurance one, with managers taking a share in deviations of actual 
sales from expected. At the same time, abler managers do not receive higher pay all else 
equal, which implies that middle management ability is not fully tradable. 
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like thank the participants for their comments and suggestions. This study investigates the link between management and econo-
mic performance at the establishment level. Our unique data enable
us to assess the overall contribution of the important, but elusive, ma-
nagement factor of production, as well as partition it into standards
of practice and personal abilities. We also examine the pay system
that the ﬁrm uses to make the most of its management stock.
Our data come from 245 stores belonging to a large UK clothing
retailer. By comparing subunits within a ﬁrm, all of which apply the
same standards to management measurement, we obtain essential con-
trol over our key management variables. In this respect, our study is
similar to that by Griﬃth et al. (2006) who collect data on manage-
ment ability and productivity within the branches of a single organi-
sation, a nationwide UK building materials ﬁrm. Overall, therefore,
our organisation’s hundreds of stores scattered nationwide provide a
unique experimental setup within which to analyse the relationship
between middle management ability, pay and productivity.
We measure management ability using the company’s own survey
of six key behavioural indicators (KBIs): “sales focus”, “commercial
awareness”, “developing people”, “drive and personal development”,
“leadership”, and “planning and organising”. Depending on the evi-
dence provided for each of the survey’s questions, each participating
store manager was given one of the three grades for each KBI – “de-
velopment need” (signifying inadequate performance), “capable” (mi-
nimum appropriate performance) and “strength” (exceptional perfor-
2mance).
There are two parts to our analysis. First, we establish the link
between labour productivity in each store and the manager’s ability
as measured by his/her KBIs. We obtain plausible estimates of the
diﬀerences in labour productivity between stores run by managers
with diﬀerent KBI grades, with commercial awareness being the most
important. We also derive the contributions to labour productivity
of management practices (the diﬀerence in productivity between the
grades capable and development need, 11%) and management ability
(the diﬀerence between strength and capable, 6%).
In the second part of our analysis we aim to explain why some
managers perform above the required practice standards by conside-
ring manager pay incentives. An eﬀective linkage of a store manager’s
pay to her store’s sales performance is presumably required to explain
our ﬁnding of a further contribution of management beyond the grade
capable. We indeed ﬁnd such a link. While managers do not have
explicit performance pay contracts, we ﬁnd that they share in both
positive and negative deviations of store productivity from expected.
1 Prior literature and our study
Management has been put ﬁrmly among the factors determining la-
bour productivity in the academic literature (e.g., Bartelsman and
Doms, 2000; Kaldor (1934) was a pioneer). Here we study the store
manager level of the organisational hierarchy, leaving aside the upper
3levels, i.e. those of the area manager and the company’s headquarters.
Since management input varies greatly between ﬁrms and workplaces,
it is likely to have a large eﬀect on economic performance, at least at
the low levels of aggregation.
The literature distinguishes between management ability and ma-
nagement practices, a distinction we also adopt. Performance rankings
are often used to measure ability. Thus, Alvarez and Arias (2003) use
an establishment ﬁxed eﬀects ranking as a measure of management
input, and ﬁnd that it reduces average costs of production. Similar-
ly, output has been found to be positively correlated with rankings
on inventory, sales, strategic management (Baumel and Fuller, 1964;
Sonka et al., 1989), product quality and sales and budget goal attain-
ment (Meﬀord, 1986). Griﬃths et al. (2006) use a wider “balanced
scorecard” approach to assess management ability in each store in a
UK building materials wholesaler, averaging manager scores on ﬁnan-
cial, customer satisfaction, innovation and internal controls criteria.
They ﬁnd a movement from the lower to the upper quartile in mana-
gement ability to account for 40% of the interquartile range of labour
productivity (p. 523), which is close to our result. Bloom and Van
Reenen (2007), using a more sophisticated measure of management
input, ﬁnd that the same movement explains 10-23% of the interquar-
tile total factor productivity (TFP) range (p. 1371). Our estimate for
total factor productivity is higher, which we explain.
Another approach to measuring management ability is simply to
4sweep it out by allowing for a manager ﬁxed eﬀect (for example, Black
and Lynch’s (2004) study of workplace innovation). Mundlak (1961)
reports reductions in factor input elasticities once local management
is controlled for by means of such ﬁxed eﬀects, implying a positive
“elasticity” of management input. (Lucas (1978) has derived a theo-
retical model explaining why better managers should be employed in
bigger ﬁrms, which explains the reported reduction in input elasticities
more completely.) Lieberman et al. (1990) ﬁnd changes in particu-
lar top managers to be the most important force behind productivity
growth in major U.S. and Japanese car manufacturers. Bertrand and
Schoar (2003) also report that particular top managers signiﬁcantly
aﬀect ﬁrm policies and returns on assets, using a sample of 2,300 large
U.S. ﬁrms. While the ﬁxed-eﬀects approach is useful (we too use ﬁxed
eﬀects for area managers), our management data allow more insight
into the workings of management than simply sweeping them out via
ﬁxed eﬀects.
The literature on management practices concerns individual practi-
ces as well as “bundles”. Most studies on individual practices have loo-
ked at human resource management (HRM). Signiﬁcant improvements
in ﬁrm performance have been found with more employee training (de
Grip and Sieben, 2005; Dearden et al., 2006), better communication
between employees and management (Kersley and Martin, 1997; Bar-
tel, 2004), greater employee participation in decision making (Black
and Lynch, 2004; Srivastava et al., 2006), and performance-related pay
5and promotion (Kahn and Sherer, 1990; Audas et al., 2004). Perfor-
mance pay is a particularly powerful practice, as shown by Bandiera
et al. (2007) who found a 21% increase in workers’ productivity in
response to the introduction of managerial performance pay (see al-
so Lazear (2000) who found a 44% productivity increase following a
shift from ﬂat to piece wage rate.) Performance pay for store mana-
gers plays an important role in explaining our results. Our measure
of HRM practices, however, does not fare well in the productivity
regressions, which we explain.
A few studies look at practices outside HRM. Galbraith and Nkwenti-
Zamcho (2005) report a positive impact on labour productivity of
equipment maintenance, ﬁrm reorganisation and labour specialisati-
on. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) survey four areas of management
practices - operations, monitoring, targets and incentives (18 practices
altogether) - in companies across four countries and ﬁnd that all prac-
tice areas (and many individual practices) are important for labour
productivity. We too use indicators from a wide range of practices,
ﬁnding, however, that not all of them are signiﬁcant.
Several studies look at the eﬀects of management practice “bund-
les”. Arthur (1994) classiﬁes HRM policies into “control” and “com-
mitment” HRM systems and ﬁnds workplaces with a “commitment”
HRM system to have higher labour productivity. Ichniowski et al.
(1997) report a similar ﬁnding, having grouped the observed HRM
practices into four systems, from the most traditional (i.e., control) to
6the most innovative (i.e., commitment, or high-performance). They
also ﬁnd the impact of HRM practices to be at its maximum when
they are grouped into bundles that reinforce complementarities bet-
ween them, a ﬁnding also reported in Macduﬃe (1995). As a robust-
ness check to our main results, having grouped management grades
together, we too ﬁnd some evidence that management practices com-
plement each other.
2 The model and estimation issues
Following the modelling approach of Ichniowski et al. (1997) and
Bartel (2004), we went to meet the company’s managers for ideas on
the model to describe sales of an individual store. We took a series of
interviews between February and October 2006 and came up with the
following description.
2.1 Store sales
A store receives goods and sells them after adding a certain mark-
up. Sales depend on the cost of sales, labour and store space, as well as
store, area and workforce characteristics, including store management.
It is also aﬀected by various unobservable circumstances, both speciﬁc
to a particular store (e.g., unobserved location characteristics) and
idiosyncratic (e.g., temporary disruptions in business). We do not
have information on the cost of sales, but, plausibly assuming that
it is a constant fraction of the total sales, we will abstract from it.
7We also control for the possibility of diﬀerent goods having diﬀerent
mark-ups by controlling for store type and location and the share of
children’s goods in total sales.
The observed sales volume is the outcome of solving the problem
of allocating limited resources between the stores by the central ma-
nagement in the long and medium run, and delegating this solution
in the short run to the local store managers. By deﬁnition, in the
long run (several years in our case) all inputs are variable. In the
medium run, while capital and management inputs are given, labour
input may be corrected taking into account changes in operating envi-
ronment and newly acquired information. This correction takes place
at the beginning of the accounting year (February), by allocating an
annual wage budget to each store equal to an agreed fraction of its last
year’s sales (the average for 2005 was around 10%). In the short run
(i.e., within the year), store managers allocate labour between weeks
to utilise their wage budget, while all other variables remain given. In
so doing they must match labour inputs to seasonality of sales, with
peak periods at Christmas, Easter, and the start of the school term.
This simple description lends itself to the following short-run sales
function:
yipt = f(lipt,spt,xip) + uip + eipt, (1)
where i, p and t are store, year and week counters; y is log sales; l is
log weekly labour input; s is a weekly dummy to capture seasonality
of sales; x is the vector of other explanatory variables; u and e are
8unobservable store-speciﬁc and idiosyncratic shocks to sales, respecti-
vely. Notice that l has all three indices because labour input varies by
store, week and year, while the weekly dummies are the same for all
stores (hence no store index i) and the other controls, though diﬀerent
across stores, are ﬁxed for the duration of the year (hence no t index).
Since we have complete data only for one year, 2005, the index p
in equation (1) may look redundant, but it does play a role as we now
show. Suppose the unobservable shock to sales uip follows a ﬁrst-order
autoregressive process:
uip = φ · uip−1 + ηip , (2)
where 0 < φ < 1 is the autoregression parameter, ηip is annual random
noise in sales which follows a continuous distribution with zero mean
and a ﬁnite second moment and is independent of the regressors and
serially uncorrelated; also cov(uip,ηip+1,2,...) = 0.
The proﬁt-maximising solution of the resource allocation problem
in the long run implies proportionality between the inputs. So, given
the input prices, we expect to see better managers appointed to bigger
size stores and managing more labour. This allocation of managers
to stores, and labour to managers, is consistent with the theoretical
insight of Lucas (1978) that better managers control more assets. In
the medium run, however, capital and management inputs are ﬁxed.
Thus the only way to adapt to changes in trade environment is to ad-
just annual labour input. Part of this adjustment happens in response
9to changes in trading environment, and part is due to changes in the
expected value of the unobservable term, E(uip) = φ·uip−1 (equation
(2)), implying that labour input in year p is a positive function of
the last year’s unexpected sales, uip−1, which is consistent with the
company’s actual wage budget practice.
For an illustration, consider a Cobb-Douglas sales function with






ip · eφ·uip−1, subject to the budget con-
straint,
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i=1 wip · Lip = B, with wages (w) given and capital input
















ipeφ·uip−1 is the Lagrange multiplier.
The positive log-linear relationship between L and u still holds, albeit
approximately, for a more general constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) sales function speciﬁcation, through a log-linearisation of the
applicable ﬁrst-order condition for labour input.
With capital and management inputs ﬁxed and the trading envi-
ronment exogenous, uip−1 is uncorrelated with all the observed va-





Therefore, we can develop a proxy for uip−1 in the sales function by
regressing annual labour input on the rest of the observed variables
10that are constant throughout the year (xip),
lnLip = xip × g + ξip . (4)
We then use the residuals from this regression (ξip) to control for last
year’s unexpected sales, uip−1 in the sales function (equation (1)).
What then remains of uip is annual random noise in sales, ηip, which is
orthogonal to all the regression variables, and which will be important
in the manager pay equation in the next sub-section. Note from equa-
tion (3) that if the sales function is Cobb-Douglas, ξip ≡
φ
1−α · uip−1,
and if it is CES, ξip ∼ =
φ
1−α · uip−1, so that we can in any case gauge
the persistency of the unobservable shock to sales (as measured by φ)
from year to year.
Controlling for uip−1 is important. Admittedly, our proxy for uip−1
is ξip, which is orthogonal to the rest of the regression variables in the
sales equation (1) by construction, and so the estimates for all the
other variables will not be aﬀected whether we include it or not. Still,
using uip−1 allows us to estimate the autoregression parameter φ from
equation (2) and thereby the annual random noise in sales (η) which
will be important in the manager pay equation. In addition, as we
explain below, the autoregression parameter φ allows us to investiga-
te how much our regression results for management depend on the
assumption that management input is exogenous to the store-speciﬁc
unobservable term u.
We have learnt from management interviews some of the structu-
11ral elements of the sales function we want to estimate. However, the
function cannot be fully identiﬁed without accounting for store mana-
gers’ eﬀort. Because management ability requires eﬀort to be brought
out, we need to model a mechanism through which the company can
provide incentives for its store managers. In fact, while incentives are
“the essence of economics” (Prendergast, 1999: 7), no study of ma-
nagement in the context of a production function has yet internalised
them in the modelling of the management-performance link. The next
subsection outlines a variant of the standard performance pay model
which describes a plausible incentive mechanism.
2.2 Store manager pay
We use a simple agency model of performance-related pay (drawing
on Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)), which is
reasonable given that store sales are an easily available measure of
manager performance (problems with distorted measures are discus-
sed in Baker (2002); see also Courty and Marschke (2003)). The model
predicts that, when eﬀort can only be monitored imperfectly (which
is true for a geographically dispersed organisation such as ours), in
order to induce the manager to exert eﬀort, part of her pay must be
conditioned on her output. In our case, salaries are mostly ﬁxed at
the start of the trading year and bonuses are too small to be eco-
nomically important. However, as explained to us by the company’s
HR department, the company does take into account store managers’
past sales performance, as well as the labour market situation, when
12reviewing manager contracts for the next trading year. This practice
is tantamount to having explicit incentive pay contracts.
The model describes a one-period game between a risk-neutral
principal (the company) and a risk-averse agent (the store manager).
The agent produces output (y1) which depends on her eﬀort (), ob-
servable to her only, ability (c), observable to both parties, and the
annual random noise term (η), observable to none (all letter notations
are the same as before, store subscripts are suppressed for simplicity),
y = η if  = 0,
y =  + c + η if  > 0. (5)
The manager receives a wage (w) from the principal which in part
depends on the past period’s output,
w = α + βη if  = 0,
w = α + β( + c + η), if  > 0,
α,β ≥ 0,
and maximises utility,
U (w,) = E(w) − δ ·
2
2
− λ · var(w), (6)
1There are, of course, other determinants of output, but since they do not depend on
store managers (unlike c and ) and are assumed to be observed to both parties (unlike
η), we will abstract from them.
13where parameters δ > 0 and λ > 0 represent the cost of eﬀort and
aversion to uncertainty regarding the realised value of output. (Our
assumption that delta is invariant with respect to management ability
is admittedly heroic, but we test it below.) The optimum level of





and she will work for the principal only when her utility given the
eﬀort,
U (w(∗),∗) = α + βc +
β2
2δ
− λβ2 · var(η),
is at least as high as her reservation utility, ¯ u(z,c) (the reservation
utility is allowed to vary with ability c and other parameters z reﬂec-
ting the outside options available to the manager, e.g., pay for similar
occupations in the area).
The principal maximises
Π = E(y − w) =  + c − α − β( + c),
given the agent’s reservation utility and eﬀort, and derives the optimal
wage contract as follows:
α∗ = ¯ u(z,c) −
c
1 + 2λδ · var(η)
−
1 − 2λδ · var(η)
2δ(1 + 2λδ · var(η))2,
β∗ =
1
1 + 2λδ · var(η)
, (8)
14implying
w = ¯ u(z,c) +
1
2δ(1 + 2λδ · var(η))
+
1
1 + 2λδ · var(η)
· η. (9)
Equations (7) - (9) allow us to make several observations regarding
the assumed behaviour of the principal and agent, as follows. First,
if there is no incentive pay (i.e. β = 0) the agent will make no eﬀort
at all; if, however, there is incentive pay it is always optimal for the
agent to exert some eﬀort. Second, the model predicts that the extent
of incentive pay, β∗, and the exerted eﬀort, ∗, are the same for all
managers; and therefore, given all other determinants, sales vary only
due to ability and random noise (η) which we estimate from the sales
equation2. (A slightly more complex model in Schaeﬀer (1998) results
in ∗ also being dependent upon store size; we control for this possible
dependency in robustness checks below.) Third, the incentive part
of manager pay (fraction times η in equation (9)) depends not on
observed output, but on unexpected output (η), because the observed
components of output are absorbed by the ﬁxed wage component and
proﬁt.
2.3 Estimation issues
Following Black and Lynch (2004) and Bloom and Van Reenen
2This implication does not hold for other speciﬁcations of the output equation (5). For
example, assuming x =  · c + η results in ,α and β being nonlinear functions of c. We
do a robustness check of the results derived under equation (9) (see Table 7), but ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the coeﬃcient estimates for η between diﬀerent KBI grades, and
hence no evidence to reject our simple speciﬁcation.
15(2007), we start by assuming our sales function (1) to be Cobb-
Douglas. However, the Cobb-Douglas is a rather restrictive speciﬁ-
cation because it assumes constant elasticities of output with respect
to inputs and unit elasticity of substitution between any two inputs,
both of which assumptions may be questionable. Having more than
10,000 observations of sales and labour input we can relax these re-











αk1k2zk1iptzk2ipt + uip + eipt, (10)
where K is the total number of variables in vector z (which includes
l, s and x from equation (1)), and αk1k2 = αk2k1. The translog is an
approximation to a large class of production functions (Christensen
et al., 1973), imposing few restrictions on the curvature of the pro-
duction possibility frontier. In our case, a translog speciﬁcation of
the sales equation fares better than Cobb-Douglas. Although the two
competing speciﬁcations produce similar estimates for the key regres-
sion variables, the translog shows higher overall signiﬁcance, so we
prefer it.
Working with weekly data for sales and employment, it is impor-
tant to allow for gradual adjustment of actual sales to their predicted
level. We therefore introduce lags of the dependent and explanato-
ry variables in the regression equation (10), which, after replacing uip













where M = yipt−1 −
P






φ·uip−1−ηip. Here the αs are the instantaneous, and βs are the “long-
run” eﬀects of the model variables on sales, 1−γ measures the speed
of adjustment of the actual sales to their predicted level, and vit is an
idiosyncratic, serially uncorrelated error term. As discussed earlier,
we proxy the last year’s unexpected sales, uip−1, with the residuals ξip
from the total annual labour input equation 4.
Following Black and Lynch (2004) and Bloom and Van Reenen
(2007), we estimate equation (11) in two steps. First, we obtain esti-
mates (ˆ αs, ˆ βs and ˆ γ) for the time-varying variables (weekly labour
input, week dummies, lagged dependent variable) and recover store
ﬁxed eﬀects (which at this stage include x, the proxy for last year’s
unexpected sales, ξip, and the annual random noise term, ηip). At the
second step, we regress the store ﬁxed eﬀects on the x and ξip. We
calculate the input elasticities at the means of the respective variables,
for example




The standard errors for the elasticities are computed from Monte Car-
lo simulations, given the regression coeﬃcients’ point estimates and
variance-covariance matrix.
17As in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), we instrument labour input
to control for biases due to simultaneous determination of inputs and
output by an unobserved process (see Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer
(2000) for a more detailed discussion of input simultaneity), using lags
of labour input from 2 to 5 as instruments, but ﬁnd that instrumenta-
tion makes little diﬀerence to the estimates. Using data from a single
company helps ensure that time-varying unobservables are the same
for all stores and thus can be captured by the week dummies, so that
simultaneity is not so much of a problem in our data. Also, we do not
need to instrument the lagged dependent variable, because the bias to
its estimate due to correlation with the store ﬁxed eﬀect is negligible
in long (52 weeks) panels, such as ours. We also test for autocor-
relation in the ﬁrst-step residual, vipt, ﬁnding which would imply an
incorrectly speciﬁed model because in that case cov(vipt,yipt−1) > 0,
contrary to the assumption of orthogonality between the error term
and regression variables. Our preferred translog speciﬁcation passes
this test.
It only remains to estimate the store manager wage equation (9).
Assuming the manager’s reservation utility to be log-linear in its ar-
guments, we regress log total salary on manager ability and practices
(the KBI’s), store and area characteristics, and, following our incen-
tive pay model, the annual random noise term, η, which is the time-
invariant component of the residual from equation (11). A ﬁnding
that the estimate for η is signiﬁcant would conﬁrm the existence of an
18incentive mechanism for store managers. However, it may be the case
that not the entire annual random noise term is relevant for manager
pay. We cater for this possibility by experimenting with its “techni-
cal ineﬃciency” component which is relatively more prevalent when
sales expectations are not met. Indeed, we ﬁnd that contracting on
technical ineﬃciency, rather than the full η, gives a slightly better
representation of the manager pay determination process.
In summary, our estimation procedure relies on linking the results
of diﬀerent equations. First, the residual ξip from the labour input
equation (4) is used as a proxy for the last year’s unexpected sales,
uip−1, in the sales equation (11). Then the time-invariant error term
from equation (11), η, is used in estimating the manager pay equation
(9). This linking, based on simple theoretical arguments (the AR(1)
process for unexpected sales, which is consistent with the company’s
wage budget practice, and the incentive pay model), ensures that our
estimation procedure is internally consistent.
3 The data
Our analysis runs through the data collected for the trading year Fe-
bruary 2005 to February 2006. The reason for taking only one year’s
worth of observations is to ensure that the same manager was in char-
ge of a given store for the entire study period. All managers who
participated in the survey must have been running their stores for at
least a year as of February 2006. There are 245 such stores.
19Our data come from a number of sources. Company accounting
records provide weekly data on sales (our dependent variable) and
hours worked (our measure of labour input), as well as sales assistant
and store manager characteristics (age, gender, contract hours, dates
hired and left, turnover, pay). The data on management ability come
from the company’s in-house survey run by its HR department (see
below).
We also use area data which include average hourly earnings by
occupation (from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey), the unem-
ployment rate and the number of competitors in the local area. The
data on competitors come from the company’s own survey of stores
with the same main business and situated within a given store’s catch-
ment area. Finally, we use the following store characteristics: space
(our measure of capital input), location, brand, and share of child-
ren’s products. With a few observations missing or discarded (e.g.,
store being temporarily closed), the resulting dataset contains 12,671
complete observations for 245 stores over 52 weeks.
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 summarises our data, beginning with store characteris-
tics. The average store is, in UK terms, comparable to a small enter-
prise, employing 314.5 worker-hours of labour a week (8.4 full-time-
equivalent (FTE) workers, 1 week = 37.5 hours), and occupying about
150 square metres of space. Hence, we take our dataset as enabling
an analysis of some 245 small enterprises. At the same time, despite
20the fact that they are all part of the same company, selling the main
brand of medium-priced casual clothing and generally located in large
shopping centres, our enterprises vary considerably in productivity.
As can be seen the standard deviation of productivity across stores
is £15.07, giving a coeﬃcient of variation relative to mean producti-
vity of 25% (=15.07/59.93). It is this high variation in productivity
– which is persistent (Siebert and Zubanov, 2008) – that we aim to
understand.
[Table 1 about here.]
Our organisation needs to accommodate large ﬂuctuations in busi-
ness by season and day of the week, which requires a ﬂexible workforce.
Indeed, most of the sales assistants work less than 15 hours per week.
There is also high employee turnover (FTE quit rate = 0.15, hiring
rate = 0.08), characteristic of the retail sector. But such ﬂuid conditi-
ons present a challenge to the store manager who must match labour
input to ﬂuctuating demand while keeping turnover under control.
The average area pay and unemployment are in line with the na-
tional averages. Competitive pressure, however, varies quite dramati-
cally, averaging at a rather high level, 36.45 stores in the catchment
area. High competition is thus another challenge store managers must
face.
As for store managers, we see that an average manager is in her
late 30s, and has worked for the company for a considerable part of
21her working life (indeed, many were recruited from the ranks of the
sales assistants). Most of the managers are women, but the share of
men (0.27) is twice as high as for sales assistants. Their average pay
rate in 2006 (£11.24 per hour) exceeds that for similar occupations
in the area (£11.06 per hour) – unlike that of sales assistants. (Note
that the manager pay data are for 2006, one year after the sales data.)
The variance in manager pay is large when compared, for example,
with the variance in store assistant pay. Thus the coeﬃcient of variati-
on for manager pay is 23% (=2.59/11.24), compared to 5% (=0.23/5.02)
for store assistants. This variance in fact parallels the variance in sales
per hour (coeﬃcient of variation=25%), and reﬂects signiﬁcant diﬀe-
rences in how much our organisation values its store managers. It is
true that a source of this variation might be diﬀerences in regional
economic conditions. However, variation in the managers’ pay by La-
bour Force Survey region (twenty-one in total) explains only about a
quarter of the total, suggesting other important sources of variance
such as store performance and/or management ability. In fact, we see
that bonuses are small, averaging only 2.8% of salary. But bonuses
need not be the only form of incentive pay. As noted above, each
store manager goes through an annual salary review where her salary
is determined taking past sales performance into consideration – con-
sistent with the model of manager pay that we use.
3.2 Key Behavioural Indicators
All managers who had worked in their stores for at least one year as
22of early 2006 were surveyed. This minimum tenure restriction ensures
that every store manager has enough evidence for their performance to
be adequately assessed. The survey, produced by the company’s Hu-
man Resources department, contains twenty-eight questions covering
six management practice areas, or key behavioural indicators (KBIs):
sales focus, commercial awareness, developing people, drive and per-
sonal development, leadership, and planning and organising. It took
a dedicated HR team, store and area managers ﬁve months to collect,
verify and summarise these data.
Each store manager had ﬁrst to ﬁll in the survey questionnaire.
Those self-assessments were later discussed with the area managers,
and then, based on the evidence supporting the self-assessment results,
agreed assessments were produced. There were three assessment gra-
des for each characteristic: development need, capable and strength.
The descriptions of the grades – the same for all stores – correspond
to inadequate performance, performance up to the minimum standard
required by the company, and performance above the standard. The
agreed assessments were later grouped, and the aggregate grades for
each of the six KBIs were produced. We were granted access to these
aggregate grades. An overall management grade can also be calcula-
ted, as a weighted average of the six KBI grades. 0.82% of the sample
achieved the highest overall grade, A; 14.3% a B; 65.3% a C; 14.7% a
D; and 4.9% an E. The actual descriptions of each KBI are reported
in Table 2.
23[Table 2 about here.]
As can be seen from Table 2, the KBI survey is broad, covering
an extensive range of practices, from the more administrative (such as
planning and organising) to the more entrepreneurial (such as com-
mercial awareness). Admittedly, there are overlaps, for example, both
sales focus and leadership reward team building. At the same time,
the important commercial awareness KBI appears to be unique. It
emphasizes monitoring local competition, adjusting manpower sub-
ject to the wage budget constraint, and making the best use of space
on the sales ﬂoor - none of which are touched on by the other KBIs.
As we will show by comparing the estimates for the KBIs entered se-
parately and jointly into the sales equation, it is the characteristics of
commercial awareness that matter for productivity.
Table 3 shows that the performance of store managers with respect
to the KBIs varies considerably. About 20% were rated as develop-
ment need for sales focus, commercial awareness, leadership and drive
and personal development, and around a quarter were rated at the
highest grade. The best-performing KBI is planning and organising,
in which 95% of the store managers achieve satisfactory performance.
The weakest results are for developing people, with 40% of store ma-
nagers underperforming.
[Table 3 about here.]
24The KBI grades are predictably correlated with store size and ma-
nager salaries. Managers with a higher grade are found in larger stores,
in more competitive areas, employing more people and receiving hig-
her pay. Average labour productivity too tends to increase with the




Table 4 reports the main regression results for our preferred trans-
log speciﬁcation of the sales function (equation 10). The regression
produces plausible estimates and shows high overall signiﬁcance. The
input elasticities are meaningful, implying returns to scale of 0.765.
That returns to scale are less than 1 makes economic sense, because
there are other inputs in particular management.
[Table 4 about here.]
The translog speciﬁcation reveals the short-run dependency of the
labour input elasticity on the time of the year, store space (coeﬃcients
not shown) and, most importantly, store manager. Thus, managers
with higher grades for the planning and organising KBI achieve a
higher labour input elasticity in the short run - presumably as a result
25of their better ability to mobilise labour at times when its eﬃciency
is the highest. However, this eﬀect is not preserved in the long run,
unlike other eﬀects of management, as follows.
Looking at the KBI grades, we enter them separately and joint-
ly with the aim of detecting overlaps and ﬁnding which is the most
important. Most KBIs are individually signiﬁcant, but commercial
awareness is is the largest. As we see, only the KBIs for commercial
awareness and leadership retain signiﬁcance when entered jointly. This
result indicates signiﬁcant intercorrelations between diﬀerent KBIs,
presumably as a result of overlapping deﬁnitions. That said, evident-
ly it is the special characteristics of commercial awareness which are
important for productivity, since its coeﬃcients are similar whether
entered separately or jointly. As noted above, these characteristics
consist mainly of entrepreneurial skills, such as monitoring local com-
petition and making the best use of resources subject to the wage
budget rule.
Store managers rated capable for commercial awareness achieve
11% higher annual sales than their colleagues with grade development
need, and those with grade strength achieve 17% higher sales. All
else equal, these diﬀerences in sales mean the same diﬀerences in la-
bour productivity between stores. Thus, given our interpretation of
the grade capable as deﬁning the minimum appropriate performance,
the contribution of commercial awareness practices to productivity is
11%, and the contribution of management ability beyond fulﬁlling the
26minimum practice is 6% (=17-11).
Another KBI, leadership, also makes a diﬀerence to productivity.
Managers with grade capable for this KBI are 6% more productive
than those with a development need; but there appears to be no fur-
ther improvement in productivity associated with extra ability on this
KBI. Other KBIs are insigniﬁcant.
The signs on other control variables are consistent with conventio-
nal economic reasoning. Thus, having more workers on short contract
hours enters positively (0.19 to 0.28), presumably because such wor-
kers create a ﬂexible workforce, leading to higher productivity when
demand is turbulent. Paying higher wages relative to competitors’
enters positively (0.69) because better quality workers are attracted.
Sales tend to be higher in wealthier areas, and also where there are
clusters of competitors.
Finally, we observe that shocks to sales are quite persistent. About
40% (1 − (1 − γ)) of the last week’s shock to sales carries over to the
current week. Also, recalling equation (4), we calculate that, given
the estimate for ξip (0.68) and the long-run labour input elasticity of
0.44, the autoregression parameter φ for the unobservable shock to
sales is around 0.4 (=0.68*(1-0.44)). The latter result suggests signi-
ﬁcant persistency of store-speciﬁc unobservables in the sales function,
a result which better enables us to see what happens if we no longer
assume exogeneity of management inputs in the sales equation (see
below).
274.2 Store manager pay
Table 5 reports the regression results for log store manager total
annual pay in 2006. Most important, the annual random noise term
for sales (η) is a signiﬁcant determinant of pay, which is consistent
with the predictions of our incentive pay model (equation (9)). The
0.2 elasticity result conﬁrms that pay varies less than one-to-one with
sales, implying that managers do not receive their exact marginal pro-
duct of labour. Rather, being risk-averse, they surrender part of the
windfall pay in a lucky year (when η > 0) as an insurance against
their loss of income in a bad year (η < 0). Thus, a standard deviation
change in η of 11% (see Table 4 for ση) causes a 2.2% change in a store
manager’s pay (about £460 on average, given annual pay of £21,000).
[Table 5 about here.]
Table 5 also shows the eﬀects of other determinants of manager
pay. We see that pay is higher for male store managers, and for those
living in areas with higher pay and more competitors – presumably
reﬂecting the more generous outside options available to them. Ma-
naging more workers attracts a premium as well, which is consistent
with the greater diﬃculty of running a larger store, and the extra
responsibilities that come with it.
At the same time, we do not ﬁnd a strong correlation between
pay and most of the KBIs. This ﬁnding holds whether or not we
control for other determinants of manager pay, in particular store
28workforce size and space which may also link with management ability.
The implication is that the KBIs measure a type of company-speciﬁc
middle management ability which raises sales in company stores (Table
4), but which is not easily tradable on the outside labour market.
4.3 Robustness checks
We have already mentioned that our main regression results are
robust to the type of the sales function (Cobb-Douglas or translog)
and input endogeneity. Here we report the results of extra checks of
the robustness of the regression results for productivity and manager
pay to a selection of alternative speciﬁcations. Tables 6 and 7 report
the results based on the uninstrumented translog speciﬁcation of the
sales equation (11). Basically, we ﬁnd that most of our main regression
results are quite robust, although looking at our data from diﬀerent
angles does lend some extra insights.
Store sales. First we address the issue of measurement error in the
KBIs (speciﬁcation I in Table 6) which might have caused some of the
KBIs to be insigniﬁcant. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) ﬁnd that the
variance of their management scores due to measurement error is from
25% to 42% of the total (p. 1366). We do not have two or more in-
dependent observations for the same manager, so we cannot correlate
their results to estimate the extent of the measurement error. Still,
we can at least partially control for measurement error by including in
the sales equation the “noise controls” which might be correlated with
KBI measurement errors, even though they are probably irrelevant to
29sales.
[Table 6 about here.]
We have some noise controls already in the equation. First, the
KBIs control each other because their measurement errors are correla-
ted. Second, the area manager dummies, which are rarely signiﬁcant
on their own, should account for biases in the judgement of the area
managers who interviewed the store managers. Indeed, excluding the
insigniﬁcant KBIs and area manager dummies from the equation redu-
ces the estimates for commercial awareness somewhat, reﬂecting the
attenuation bias introduced by measurement errors in this important
KBI.
In addition to the existing noise controls, we use manager age, gen-
der and experience with the company. The inclusion of these variables
leads to a small increase in the estimates for commercial awareness
compared to Table 4, as expected. At the same time, it must be re-
membered that the extent of measurement error in our data is likely
to be much smaller than in the average postal or telephone survey
(the KBI survey was compulsory and store managers were required to
supply evidence to back up their responses), and is further reduced by
having only a few grades of management ability.
We next focus on controlling for residual heteroscedasticity by al-
lowing the variance of random noise η to vary with workforce size
(speciﬁcation II in Table 6). Here we ﬁnd some negative correlation
30between residual variance and the workforce size, implying that sales
in larger stores are somewhat more predictable, but, again, our main
regression results remain robust to this speciﬁcation.
Finally, we introduce additional management variables – dummies
for the overall management grade (speciﬁcation III in Table 6) and
bundles of KBIs with the same grade or higher (speciﬁcation IV) –
to see if there is a joint eﬀect of several KBIs not captured by their
individual estimates. There is some evidence that sets of diﬀerent abi-
lities matter beyond their individual components, supporting the ma-
nagement practice complementarity view (Macduﬃe 1995; Ichniowski,
Shaw and Prennushi 1997). However, the overall eﬀect of management
bundles is not as important as that of individual KBIs (see next sec-
tion for some quantitative illustrations). The complementarity eﬀect
appears to be particularly strong for the star managers with an overall
grade A, bringing an extra 20% improvement in labour productivity;
but with such a small share of these managers in our sample (less
than 1%) this result must be taken with caution. For the majority
(80%) of managers with grades B or C there is virtually no diﬀerence
in performance by grade. It is only the minority (19%) of managers
with grades D or E who appear to be doing worse than the rest, but
even then the diﬀerence is on the brink of statistical signiﬁcance.
Store manager pay. We have experimented to ascertain whether
the insigniﬁcance of the KBIs in the pay equation 8 is a result of
(over)controlling for average pay in the area, or store size. However,
31the KBIs still remain insigniﬁcant even after these variables have been
excluded, while the other estimates stay virtually unchanged. Thus,
our earlier conclusion remains, that the market for management abi-
lity, as measured by the KBIs, is limited.
We further check the robustness of the manager pay regression
results by running equation (9) on sub-samples formed by each gra-
de of commercial awareness, and by stores with lower than expected
(η < 0) and higher than expected (η > 0) sales (Table 7). The esti-
mates for the determinants of store manager pay are fairly robust to
sub-sampling from the overall sample. There is no strong evidence to
suggest that the main determinants of pay – actual vs. expected sales
(η), area average pay for a similar job, workforce size, and manager
gender – diﬀer in their eﬀects by grade of commercial awareness (see
the ﬁrst of the “test equal p-val.” columns in Table 7). Therefore,
our simple speciﬁcation of the output equation for the incentive pay
model (equation (5)) with additive eﬀects of eﬀort, ability and luck is
consistent with the data.
[Table 7 about here.]
One challenge to our interpretation of the annual random noise in
sales variable η is that the estimates for it diﬀer depending on whether
the store under- or outperforms on the sales target. Thus, there are
indications that the extent of incentive pay for the unlucky managers
(sub-sample of η < 0, column 6 of Table 7) diﬀers signiﬁcantly from
32that for the lucky ones (sub-sample of η > 0), which goes against the
prediction of the model that the extent of incentive pay should be the
same regardless of the actual realisation of η3.
Perhaps instead of η we should be looking for a component of
the random noise which is relatively more prevalent when sales ex-
pectations are not met. The theory of stochastic production frontiers
(Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000) identiﬁes such component as technical
ineﬃciency, a measure of failure to use the available resources at their
most productive, and oﬀers a choice of techniques of separating it from
a purely random noise.
We have tried several estimation methods for the technical ineﬃci-
ency component, and found that, when included in the pay regression,
it works in the direction expected and, in particular, is symmetrical
for both lucky and unlucky managers. Its elasticity is about -0.8, im-
plying a 2% drop in salary with every one-standard-deviation increase
in technical ineﬃciency (almost the same magnitude as for η). So, it is
not simply the diﬀerence between the actual and expected sales that
aﬀects store manager pay, but the technical ineﬃciency component of
it – however, in practice, the distinction is not important.
Causality or association? Does variation in management cause
variation in sales? As in many studies, the interpretations of our
main ﬁndings rest on the assumption that the link between the KBIs
3Allowing for β1 for η < 0 and β2 for η > 0 will still give β1 = β2 = β. Any diﬀerence
between β1 and β2 is not proﬁt-maximising, as it will have to be compensated by a higher
ﬁxed component of the wage (α).
33and sales is causal. We cannot test this assumption directly because
our management variables are time-invariant. However, we propose
the following argument for the causal nature of our regression results
with respect to management.
If the positive management-productivity link is not causal, there
exists a third, unobservable, factor which determines productivity and
management input simultaneously (here we assume away reverse cau-
sality). For example, a store located in a wealthy area may both have
high sales of clothing, and a supply of responsible, business-like people
who make good managers. This simultaneity will drive our estimates
of the impact of management upwards from their true values. We can
allow for simultaneous determination of sales and management by re-
specifying the proxy for the last year’s unexpected sales, uip−1, as the
residual from the annual labour input regressed on all the observed
variables except management (see equation (4)). Then ξip, the proxy
for uip−1, will no longer be orthogonal to the KBIs, as the causali-
ty assumption would imply, but instead the two would be positively
correlated, as simultaneity would have them be, resulting in lower
estimates for the KBIs than in our main speciﬁcation (Table 4). That
the last year’s unexpected sales appear to be important for this year’s
productivity better enables us to perform this manipulation, because,
had ξip been not signiﬁcant in the sales equation, the results for the
KBIs would be the same regardless of simultaneity.
Indeed, using the re-deﬁned proxy in the sales equation 10 with
34noise controls for management results in lower estimates for grades
capable and strength for commercial awareness: 0.071 and 0.118, res-
pectively; and leadership loses signiﬁcance altogether. Ichniowski et
al. (1997) and Bartel (2004) report the same tendency after introdu-
cing ﬁxed eﬀects to account for unobservables. In our case, however,
the above coeﬃcients are likely to be underestimates of the true casual
eﬀect, since they are obtained under the assumption that the annual
labour input does not depend on store management, which is unlikely
to be the case (cf. Lucas, 1978). At any rate, a large part of the
eﬀect of management on sales survives even after (over)controlling for
simultaneity.
5 Discussion
5.1 Management and productivity: some illustrations
We ﬁnd that the most important KBI is commercial awareness.
Variation in commercial awareness is responsible for a sizeable porti-
on of variation in productivity. We ﬁnd that moving from the bottom
quartile of the distribution of commercial awareness (i.e., develop-
ment need, 18% of the sample) to the top quartile (strength, 26%)
is associated with a 17% improvement in labour productivity. The
interquartile productivity range is 40%, so the interquartile range in
commercial awareness accounts for 43% (=17/40) of that in labour
productivity. Continuing to assume the cost of sales to be a constant
fraction of sales, we calculate the interquartile TFP range at 52%; so,
35commercial awareness accounts for 33% of variation in TFP.
Good management brings substantial economic beneﬁts, which is
easy to calculate having the distribution of managers by grade and pro-
ductivity diﬀerences between diﬀerent grade managers. Thus, given
our regression results for the KBIs and the distribution of labour bet-
ween managers of diﬀerent grades, if all managers had a development
need for commercial awareness, the total annual sales in 2005 would be
11.5% (£27.54 million) lower than actually observed. Company-wide
organisational management practices also help bring out the beneﬁts
of good store management. Our results allow us to calibrate the ef-
fects of two of such practices. One is allocating better managers to
bigger stores (see Table 3). If all managers had stores of the same
size, the total gains in labour productivity would be 10.5% instead of
the 11.5% reported above.
The other practice is incentive pay contracts. The diﬀerence bet-
ween the productivity results for the capable and strength managers
is signiﬁcant (17%-11%=6%), pointing out the importance of manage-
ment ability beyond the fulﬁlment of the minimum appropriate prac-
tice requirements. If there were no incentive pay, there would presu-
mably be no need to exert more eﬀort than was required to satisfy
the minimum, in which case the average labour productivity would be
2.35% less than observed (=0.06, the diﬀerence in productivity bet-
ween strength and capable, times the fraction of the workforce that
the strength managers control, 40%).
36Still, there is a potential to increase labour productivity by ex-
ploiting the existing pool of store managers, as well as improving its
quality through searching for, developing and rewarding talented indi-
viduals. Thus, coaching the underperforming store managers so that
they can fulﬁl all the practice requirements under commercial aware-
ness to attain grade capable would bring an extra 2% gain in sales
(=18%, the share of managers with a development need, times 11%,
the estimated increase in productivity from a development need to a
capable). Furthermore, if all managers were strength, the total sales
would be 6.4% higher (=18% times 17%, the diﬀerence between a de-
velopment need and a strength, plus 56%, the share of managers with
a capable, times 6%, the diﬀerence in productivity between a capable
and a strength).
5.2 Our results and other studies
Our ﬁndings about the importance of store management are con-
sistent with the literature. Since store managers are hard to allocate
among stores in the short run, our results help explain part of per-
sistent inter-workplace diﬀerences in productivity documented in the
earlier literature (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Griﬃths et al., 2006).
It is also instructive to compare our quantitative ﬁndings for ma-
nagement with those in the studies closest to ours. Our estimate of
the share of the interquartile range of TFP explained by manage-
ment, 33%, is somewhat higher than Bloom and Van Reenen’s (2007)
10-23%. We propose two explanations for this diﬀerence. First, in
37a cross-company study, such as theirs, it is harder to control for
company-speciﬁc factors aﬀecting the relationship between manage-
ment and productivity. As a result, this relationship may be blurred
by “contingent management” (pp. 1371-4). Second, the blurring may
occur through combining many management practices, some of which
are irrelevant to productivity, into one z-score, which makes for a
noisier management regressor and an attenuated regression estimate.
Thus, when we put grades from all the KBIs into a management z-
score its estimate becomes 0.048, and its interquartile movement is
associated with only a 6% movement in productivity, thereby accoun-
ting for only 6/52=12% of interquartile TFP range.
At the same time, if aggregating individual practices into a z-score
reduces the importance of management due to attenuation bias, the
question arises as to why our estimate of the share of interquartile pro-
ductivity range explained by management (43%) is close to Griﬃths et
al.’s (2006) 40%, which they derive from the management score aggre-
gating over 11 positions. The reason seems to be fewer controls used
in their study, a possibility they do anticipate (p. 523). Thus, when
we control only for labour input (as they do), the interquartile move-
ment in our management z-score explains nearly 70% of interquartile
productivity range, and “commercial awareness” together with “devel-
oping people” accounts for 75% of productivity’s 90/10 range. Clearly,
the degree of detail in management data and statistical controls are
equally important for the quantitative results of a management study.
38We have also accounted for the interrelation between competitive-
ness, management ability and productivity, which is an important the-
me in the literature on management and performance (Nickell, 1996),
by controlling for the number of competitors in the catchment area.
We ﬁnd a positive correlation between KBI grades and area competi-
tiveness, as did Bloom and Van Reenen (2007: 1389). Coupled with
the positive impact of management on store sales performance, this
ﬁnding supports the view that competition improves economic perfor-
mance by “weeding out” the bad managers (Griﬃths, 2001; Syverson,
2004). However, controlling for management, there is also a large
independent eﬀect of competition in the area, implying that better
management is not the only channel through which competition im-
proves economic performance. Thus, in addition to toughening the
selection of managers, competition may proxy for the eﬀects of area
unobservables (e.g., agglomeration eﬀects) on productivity.
While most of our ﬁndings on management are consistent with
the existing literature, that managerial ability in developing people is
insigniﬁcant seems to contradict the many studies showing the impor-
tance of HRM practices for ﬁrm performance (e.g., Ichniowski et al.,
1997). But this ﬁnding should be taken in the context of our orga-
nisation. Clothing retail is a turbulent business with predominantly
part-time sales assistants who are normally unskilled and inexpensive
to replace. In such an environment it is hard to develop a rationale for
comprehensive, long-term relationships between store managers and
39sales assistants, and so the lack of signiﬁcance of developing people
for manager pay is reasonable.
Turning to the manager pay results, our 0.2 estimate of the elas-
ticity of pay wth respect to unexpected sales is broadly similar to the
estimates of Murphy (1986) 0.14, Barro and Barro (1990), 0.17, and
Conyon and Murphy (2000), 0.12 for the UK and 0.27 for the US, for
the elasticity of CEO compensation to share returns. Admittedly, the-
re are limits to which we can compare the results from such diﬀerent
regression speciﬁcations. But, noting that the annual random noise
to sales η may be regarded as a gross unexpected return to assets,
it is reassuring that our estimate of the key incentive pay parameter
appears to be broadly consistent with those previously reported.
Our results ﬁt with the literature even more closely when it comes
to the elasticity of manager pay with respect to ﬁrm (store) size. Our
0.29 estimate is well within the range of estimates reported: 0.22
for UK and 0.41 for US ﬁrms (Conyon and Murphy, 2000); 0.32 for
US banks (Barro and Barro, 1990); and 0.25 for Canadian publicly
traded ﬁrms (Zhou, 2000). This range is quite narrow, considering
diﬀerences in samples with respect to time, country and industry.
That the estimates are so close has long been a puzzle (Rosen, 1992).
Finally, our ﬁnding that the pay system does not reward manager
ability (i.e., commercial awareness) as such is surprising. Still, this
ﬁnding can be explained in terms of the market for local managerial
talent being limited, an argument which has been advanced before
40(e.g., Huselid, 1995: 668).
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have looked into the black box of the management
input in the production function of a ﬁrm. We have had to conﬁne
ourselves to the short run, the trading year, when selection and de-
velopment of managers, and allocating them among stores is given.
Within this year, we have found what middle management practices
actually aﬀect sales and productivity in competitive proﬁt-maximising
environment, and how company monitoring and incentive pay policies
direct this management input. Ours is one of the few studies con-
cerning the important middle management tier (most others concern
CEOs), and this is a line of research we hope will be pursed further.
Let us consider our ﬁndings in turn.
Our data are based on an accurate company survey of manage-
ment practices and ability. The practice we found most important
is commercial awareness encapsulating entrepreneurial skills, such as
monitoring local competition and making eﬃcient use of available re-
sources. The KBI developing people, in this type of retail organisation,
with high-turnover sales staﬀ, is not important as might be expected.
The total gain in productivity associated with commercial aware-
ness is 17%, and it explains 33-43% of the interquartile diﬀerence in
productivity, depending on the measure. We argue that part of the
impact of commercial awareness (11%) is due to the practice itself, and
41part (6%) to superior management ability in carrying out the practice.
Diﬀerent company policies are presumably applied to secure each of
these eﬀects. Monitoring the correct implementation of commercial
awareness practices secures the 11% part of the gain, and the further
6% comes from incentivising the store managers with an appropriate
pay system.
As for the workings of this manager pay system, we show that the
term for unexpected annual sales (η) is a signiﬁcant and economically
important determinant of pay. The process of salary review apparent-
ly works to give an expected sales value for the year for the manager
in her store (which we assume is determined by the sales function
we estimate), and positive/negative deviations are proportionately re-
warded/punished. This ﬁnding is consistent with the agency model of
asymmetric information, coupled with risk aversion among managers.
The contrasts between our pay results for middle managers and
those from studies of CEOs are noteworthy. Our 0.20 estimate of the
elasticity of middle manager pay with respect to unexpected sales is
similar to that from CEO studies. There is also a similar size elasticity.
Both results suggest that similar incentive mechanisms are at work at
the middle as well as the top of the management hierarchy. On the
other hand, we ﬁnd that abler managers do not receive higher pay all
else equal. The implication here is that middle management ability
is more specialised and less tradable, unlike CEO ability, where the
market is more open. This ﬁnding will explain why companies hire
42their CEOs on the open market, yet develop their middle management
resources in-house – as a source of competitive advantage which cannot
easily be bid away.
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50Table 2: Key behavioural indicators.





Delivers the company operational and
visual standards to drive sales perfor-
mance.
Generates a passion for high opera-
tional and visual standards in every-
one. Store consistently delivers high
standards.
2. Uses company initi-
atives to increase sales.
Makes sure all training and selling ini-
tiatives are delivered.
Gains commitment from all team
members so that training and selling
initiatives become properly embedded.
3. Exhibits and devel-
ops selling skills within
the team.
Displays thorough product knowledge
and eﬀective selling skills. Flexes sel-
ling conversations according to consu-
mer types.
Can role model excellent selling skills.
Observes performance on sales ﬂoor,
gives feedback and recommendations
for improvement.
4. Uses reports and
information to improve
sales performance.
Reviews and analyses reports and sales
information to improve performance.
Uses information to identify additional
selling opportunities.
5. Uses knowledge of
fashion trends to en-
hance sales performan-
ce.
Keeps up to date with fashion trends,
can relate them to products and uses
this knowledge in selling.
Develops in others a knowledge of fas-
hion trends and an ability to incorpo-
rate this when selling.
II. Commercial awareness
1. Aligns own plans to
business priorities.
Makes plans for peak trading periods
to ensure eﬀective use of resources.
Knows the trading period strategy and
uses it to identify priorities and deter-
mine plans which will provide the best
ﬁnancial results.
2. Uses knowledge of
products to maximise
business performance.
Knows the performance of all depart-
ments and key products within each of
these.
Makes the best use of space on the sales
ﬂoor given the store’s product mix.
3. Delivers controllable
costs.
Can manage payroll and puts plans to
deliver wage control.
Is ﬂexible and can adjust manpower
to deliver a great experience for custo-
mers while achieving the wage control
targets.
4. Observes own and
monitors competitors’
activity.
Constantly reviews the store through
the eyes of a customer and makes ad-
justments to improve the shopping ex-
perience.
Monitors local competitors and consi-
ders shopping experiences in other re-
tailers to make improvements in own
store.
III. Leadership
1. Is a positive role mo-
del.
Behaviour and work of a high profes-
sional standard. Respected by collea-
gues.
Is a highly credible role model, an in-
spiration for others.
2. Is an eﬀective com-
municator.
Sets clear expectations of performance
standards. Communicates information
clearly and concisely.
Listens and responds well. Encourages
sharing of ideas. Adapts the style of
communication to build rapport.
Continued on the next page...
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3. Builds winning
teams.
Encourages a sense of friendly compe-
tition and cooperation. Praises and re-
cognises good performance.
Generates a positive ‘buzz’. Coaches
and motivates the team to succeed
while maintaining good working rela-
tionships.
4. Makes sound decisi-
ons.
Can be relied on to make decisions
right for the store and the business.
Makes excellent decisions and consi-
ders their immediate and long-term
impact. Puts plans in place to over-
come potential barriers.
5. Managers poor per-
formance.
Takes appropriate and timely action to
address poor performance.
Diﬀerentiates between conduct and ca-
pability, identiﬁes the root cause of
poor performance and manages it ac-
cordingly.
6. Deals with and re-
solves problems.
Can deal with problems, seeks advice
when needed to resolve them.
Tackles problems in their early stages
and can make sound decisions to resol-
ve them objectively.
7. Manages change. Reacts to change positively and sells
the beneﬁts to the team.
Puts plans in place to implement chan-
ge successfully. Deals with resistance
in a positive way.
IV. Developing people
1. Uses company re-
cruitment and inducti-
on practices.
Follows company procedures in re-
cruitment. Provides induction to new
hires.
Has a good working knowledge of re-
cruitment practices. Follows up all in-
ductions to ensure their eﬀectiveness.
2. Uses training to con-
tinuously improve per-
formance.
Ensures everyone complete standard
training requirements. Keeps training
records up to date.
Identiﬁes training need and uses avai-
lable materials to deliver eﬀective trai-
ning.
3. Uses feedback to im-
prove performance.
Gives genuine praise and constructive
criticism to improve performance.





Ensures all employees attend one re-
view meeting each year to agree on bu-
siness goals and identify development
opportunities.
Follows up the formal performance
review with informal reviews of the
agreed goals and development activi-
ties.
5. Develops people for
the future.
Identiﬁes and develops individuals who
demonstrate potential and a desire to
progress.
Has a succession plan in place and de-
velops talent so that positions can be
ﬁlled internally.
V. Drive and personal development
1. Is committed to
company standards.
Shows commitment to achieve agreed
performance standards.
Strives to exceed performance
standards.
2. Is motivated to suc-
ceed.
Demonstrates passion and enthusiasm,
is motivated to succeed.
Is a self-starter, consistently passionate
and shows dedication to the task.
3. Responds to chal-
lenges positively.
Maintains a positive outlook and res-
ponds to challenges well.
Demonstrates a ‘can do’ attitude. Is




Maintains a personal development
plan. Can demonstrate improvements
in skills, knowledge and behaviour over
time.
Looks for opportunities to enhance
skills and knowledge. Shows initiative
to improve self.
Continued on the next page...
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VI. Planning and organising
1. Plans in advance. Uses company materials to plan in ad-
vance.
Plans ahead on a daily and weekly ba-
sis and carefully considers forthcoming
trading periods.
2. Prioritises tasks. Considers tasks according to impor-
tance and urgency. Understands the
diﬀerence between ‘must do’, ‘should
do’ and ‘nice to do’.




Delegates tasks and follows them up to
ensure deadlines are met.
Delegates appropriately and takes ti-
me to put tasks into context. Monitors
progress so that deadlines are met.
Source: survey documentation, minimal editing applied.
Note: A “development need” was given for sub-standard performance.
53Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Variable obs. mean std. dev.
Store characteristics
sales per hour worked 12671 59.93 15.07
total hours worked per week 12671 314.48 211.76
store space in square meters 245 148.98 82.47
store belongs to: main brand 245 0.93 0.26
other brands 245 0.07 0.26
store location: stand-alone, city centre 245 0.13 0.34
stand-alone, local area 245 0.1 0.3
sub-regional shopping centre 245 0.44 0.5
regional shopping centre 245 0.16 0.37
other 245 0.17 0.36
share of children’s products in total sales 245 0.29 0.11
Sales assistants characteristics
average sales assistant’s age, years, adjusted for full-time equivalence (FTE) 245 34.71 6.61
average sales assistant’s tenure, years, FTE 245 7.26 3.71
share of male sales assistants, FTE 245 0.13 0.14
share of sales assistants working: 0–4 hrs per week 245 0.33 0.19
5–14 hrs per week 245 0.25 0.17
15–30 hrs per week 245 0.22 0.16
30+ hrs per week 245 0.2 0.1
sales assistant’s average hourly pay 245 5.02 0.23
area average hourly pay for a similar joba 21 7.49 0.87
number of sales assistants working on an average week 12656 15.32 11.06
number of sales assistants ever worked during the year 245 22.47 17.04
separations rate, FTE 245 0.15 0.11
hiring rate, FTE 245 0.08 0.07
Area characteristics
area average pay 21 11.05 1.54
area unemployment rate 21 0.05 0.01
number of competitors in a store’s catchment area 245 36.45 25.89
Store manager characteristics
manager age (years) 236 38.06 10.09
manager experience (years) 236 10.71 6.38
store manager is male 236 0.27 0.44
manager hourly pay (based on 1,900 hours worked per year), data for 2006 236 11.24 2.59
share of bonus payments in total pay 236 0.028 0.034
area average hourly pay for a similar jobb, data for January–September 2006 21 11.06 1.45
a Intermediate, routine and semi-routine sales and services
(categories 7.2, 12.1, 12.2 and 13.1 of the Labour Force Survey occupation classiﬁer).
b Lower managerial (category 5.0) and lower and higher supervisory occupations (categories 6.0 and 10.0).
54Table 3: Averages of key variables by KBI grade.
KBI grade % FTE Store Manager Competition, Productivity
personnel space pay 1 to 4
Sales dvlp. need 17.14 6.49 119.57 10.48 2.24 55.45
focus capable 59.18 7.97 142.93 10.95 2.41 59.47
strength 23.68 11.61 185.37 12.55 2.82 61.60
Commercial dvlp. need 17.55 6.56 125.73 10.29 2.19 55.59
awareness capable 56.33 7.75 139.41 10.96 2.31 58.49
strength 26.12 11.72 185.24 12.54 3.07 62.80
Leadership dvlp. need 17.55 7.30 136.25 10.55 2.40 57.34
capable 54.29 7.49 132.71 10.83 2.27 59.24
strength 28.16 11.48 188.28 12.53 2.86 61.01
Developing dvlp. need 39.59 7.33 134.50 10.65 2.31 58.32
people capable 44.90 8.24 140.66 11.08 2.39 59.36
strength 15.51 12.74 210.02 13.24 3.09 62.20
Drive and dvlp. need 21.22 6.87 125.04 10.61 2.29 57.20
personal capable 49.80 8.00 140.58 11.10 2.35 59.43
development strength 28.98 10.83 180.95 11.95 2.80 61.04
Planning and dvlp. need 4.49 7.13 135.22 11.02 2.36 60.56
organising capable 42.04 6.97 124.62 10.54 2.18 57.53
strength 53.47 9.97 169.29 11.80 2.71 60.86
Note: 1 – number of competitors 1-17 (bottom 25%), 4 – number of competitors more than 51 (top 25%).
55Table 4: Main regression results (equation 11).
Dependent variable: Log Sales
Input Elasticities (N=12,671)
labour, short-run
labour X planning=“d.need” 0.176
labour X planning=“capable” 0.271**
labour X planning=“strength” 0.256**
labour, long-run 0.436***
store space 0.329***
Management Grades a (N=245)
sales focus “capable” 0.062*** 0.001
“strength” 0.123*** 0.034
commercial “capable” 0.106*** 0.106***
awareness “strength” 0.184*** 0.172***
leadership “capable” 0.082*** 0.057**
“strength” 0.092*** 0.014
developing “capable” 0.018 -0.019
people “strength” 0.075*** -0.001
drive & pers. “capable” 0.032 0.004
development “strength” 0.084*** 0.028
planning & “capable” -0.009 -0.051
organising “strength” 0.036 -0.064
Other Controls
weekly contract 0–4 0.283***
hours b 5–14 0.189**
15–29 0.194**
ln(area average pay) 0.953***
area unemployment rate -2.788*
ln(store assistant relative pay) 0.692***
competitors in 18-30 0.002
catchment area c 31-51 0.147***
52+ 0.278***
error-correction term (1-γ) 0.579***
proxy for last year’s shock (ξip) 0.681***
Standard errors of regression: σv = 0.128 (within-store); ση = 0.107 (between-store).
a “development need” is the base category.
b share of of employees working 30+ hours per week is the base category.
c number of competitors fewer than 17 (ﬁrst quartile of distribution) is the base category.
Other controls include: dummies for week and their interactions with changes in labour input,
area manager dummies (20), location, brand, average employee age, tenure, turnover, share of male employees,
share of children’s products in total.
From this Table onwards, ***, ** and * denote estimates signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
56Table 5: Determinants of store manager pay (equation 9).
Dependent variable: log total salary in 2006 coeﬀ. std.dev.
η (residual from the sales equation 11) 0.203 0.083 **
ln(area average pay for a similar job) 0.349 0.071 ***
ln(FTE personnel) 0.288 0.023 ***
store manager age 0.001 0.001
experience with the company 0.002 0.001
store manager is male 0.042 0.019 **
“strength” for developing people 0.051 0.031 *
other KBI grades insigniﬁcant
no. of competitors 18-30 0.014 0.023
31-51 0.050 0.027 *
52+ 0.003 0.033
adjusted R2 0.701
Number of observations 234
Note: Only managers still employed in 2006 as in 2005 are included,
hence the smaller number of observations.
Table 6: Robustness checks for the sales equation 11.
Speciﬁcation I II III IV
noise controls resid. h’scedasticity extra mgmt variables
sales focus “capable” 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.004
“strength” 0.040 0.035 0.029 0.019
commercial “capable” 0.112 *** 0.096 *** 0.095 *** 0.091 ***
awareness “strength” 0.181 *** 0.154 *** 0.160 *** 0.153 ***
leadership “capable” 0.049 ** 0.042 * 0.034 0.034
“strength” 0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009
developing “capable” -0.020 -0.010 -0.031 -0.044 **
people “strength” -0.002 0.018 -0.005 -0.032
drive & “capable” 0.007 -0.016 0.006 0.002
development “strength” 0.032 0.034 0.024 0.017
planning & “capable” -0.059 * -0.044 -0.043 -0.059
organising “strength” -0.069 * -0.058 -0.058 -0.070 *
manager
gradea
A (0.82% of sample) 0.207 ** 0.204 **
B (14.3%) 0.080 * 0.077 *
C (65.3%) 0.067 * 0.065 *
D (14.7%) -0.004 -0.011
all “development need” (0.82%) -0.076
all “capable” or higher (48.57%) 0.021
all “strength” (6.53%)b 0.038
a base category: grade E (the lowest).
b base category: at least one “development need”.
All other controls remain.
57Table 7: Robustness checks for the store manager pay equation 9.
“commercial awareness” grades test equal test equal
overall “dev.need” “capable” “strength” p-val. η < 0 η > 0 p-val.
η 0.203** 0.199 0.244** 0.075 0.763 0.273 -0.135 0.094
ln(av. pay for similar job) 0.349*** 0.351 0.294*** 0.435** 0.692 0.361*** 0.370*** 0.949
ln(FTE personnel) 0.288*** 0.307*** 0.279*** 0.291*** 0.940 0.282*** 0.278*** 0.927
store manager age 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.007** 0.001 0.003** -0.001 0.038
experience 0.002 0.001 0.005** -0.006 0.044 -0.001 0.006** 0.029
store manager is male 0.042** 0.018 0.076*** -0.019 0.140 0.066** 0.048* 0.637
sales focus “capable” -0.001 -0.044 0.017 -0.007 0.369 -0.039 0.032 0.075
“strength” 0.010 -0.002 0.058 0.026 0.580 0.009 0.034 0.653
commercial “capable” 0.015 -0.021 0.047* 0.079
awareness “strength” 0.020 -0.022 0.070* 0.074
leadership “capable” -0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.171 0.141 -0.020 0.000 0.672
“strength” 0.003 0.146 0.027 -0.194 0.059 -0.023 0.056 0.211
developing “capable” 0.009 -0.042 0.005 0.177** 0.016 0.039 -0.026 0.097
people “strength” 0.051* n.a. 0.054 0.154** 0.053 0.116** -0.046 0.014
drive & “capable” 0.000 0.045 -0.024 -0.007 0.231 0.024 -0.026 0.200
development “strength” -0.035 n.a. -0.062* -0.001 0.157 -0.008 -0.067 0.298
planning & “capable” -0.023 -0.001 -0.059 0.071 0.065 -0.009 -0.046 0.491
organising “strength” -0.037 -0.008 -0.085 n.a. 0.002 -0.014 -0.077** 0.276
Number of observations 234 42 134 58 115 119
All other controls remain.
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